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COMMON LAW PREEMPTION: ALASKA'S 
LIMITATION ON PRIVATE NUISANCE 
AND DUE PROCESS 
Oji K. Nwankwo* 
If this section is read as somehow shielding the permittee for every 
constituent of an emission or discharge by the mere mention of it in the 
permit, then we have big trouble. 
John Stonel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past quarter century, legislatures and courts in the 
United States have used several methods to protect, preserve, and 
renew the environment. Among these are private common law actions 
as well as federal and state legislation, including both civil and crimi-
nal actions.2 A complex body of contemporary environmental law 
evolved from common law actions aimed at protecting the environ-
* Articles Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Memorandum from John Stone, Alaska Department of Law, to Mike Menge (Mar. 9, 1994) 
(on file with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.) [hereinafter Stone Memorandum]. 
2 Concerned parties typically utilized common law property concepts such as nuisance, the 
public trust doctrine, trespass, negligence, and strict liability almost exclusively until the early 
1960s. See FRANK F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
§§ 1.13-.26 (1980). Because of the difficulty in obtaining injunctive relief, the expense of long 
trials spent determining close issues of fact, and the difficulty of proving a causal relationship 
between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's harm, the 1970s saw a proliferation of citizen 
suits. DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.02 
(1989); see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(d) (1988 & 
Supp. v 1993); Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. v 1993); Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). See generally MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUCATION, INC., CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (92-1)9.03) (1991). 
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ment and individuals from harms created by burgeoning industry.3 
As the public and legislators became increasingly concerned with 
environmental protection, a plethora of statutes and regulations-
both state and federal-rapidly began to replace the common law 
as the primary tool of environmental protection.4 Statutes attempted 
to make up for inadequacies in the common law.5 Today, these statutes 
and regulations define the primary substantive environmental obliga-
tions of individuals and corporations in the American legal system.6 
Common law causes of action, however, have remained as important 
mechanisms to safeguard against environmental harms not reached by 
statute.7 
Government environmental regulation has been subjected to a host 
of constitutional attacks.8 Several groups unsuccessfully challenged 
state environmental legislation and regulations on the grounds that 
the state action exceeded the scope of the states' police power-the 
basis for many state environmental regulations.9 These challenges 
alleged violations of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.lO Despite the prolif-
eration of environmental statutes and regulations, private nuisance 
actions have continued to serve as important environmental protec-
tions against highly individualized harms not addressed by broad 
state and federal governmental regulations.ll 
3 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 2.02; SKILLERN, supra note 2, §§ 1.25-.26 (discuss-
ing how the inadequacy of many traditional causes of action and a growing public awareness led 
to greater public involvement through environmental legislation); see also ZYGMUNT J. B. 
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 101 (1992) 
(stating that the common law serves as the primary underpinning for most statutes and 
regulations). 
4 See Elliot et aI., Thward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environ-
mental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985), noted in SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, 
§ 2.02; PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 101; SKILLERN, supra note 2, §§ 1.25-.26. 
5 SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 2.02. 
6 See J. GORDON ARBUCKLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 3,4 (12th ed. 1993). 
7 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 257. 
8 See ARBUCKLE, supra note 6, at 19--21, 31--35. 
9 See id. at 19-20. 
10 See id. at 31-35; PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 442-75 (discussing challenges to regula-
tions as unconstitutional takings). 
11 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 2.02; Ronald J. Rychlak, Common-Law Remedies 
for Environmental Wrongs: The Role of Private Nuisance, 59 MISS. L.J. 657, 661 (1989). 
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In Alaska, the state has enacted legislation that severely restricts 
private nuisance actions.12 Alaska passed the sweeping13 statutory 
12 Alaska Statute § 09.45.230 reads: 
[a]ction based on private nuisance 
(a) A person may bring a civil action to enjoin or abate a private nuisance. Damages 
may be awarded in the action. 
(b) A person may not maintain an action under this section based upon an air emission 
or water or solid waste discharge, other than the placement of nuclear waste, where 
the emission or discharge was expressly authorized by and is not in violation of a term 
or condition of 
(1) a statute or regulation; 
(2) a license, permit, or order that is 
(A) issued after public hearing by the state or federal government; and 
(B) subject to 
(i) continuing compliance monitoring; 
(ii) periodic review by the issuing agency; 
(iii) renewal on a periodic basis; or 
(iv) AS 46.40; or 
(3) a court order or judgment. 
(c) The provisions of (b) of this section do not apply to actions in which the air emission 
or water or solid waste discharge that is the subject of the action produces a result 
that was unknown or not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the authorization. 
(d) The provisions of (b) of this section remain in effect only as long as both of the 
following are satisfied: 
(1) AS 46.03.900 defines "pollution" as including the contamination or altering of 
waters, land, or subsurface land of the state in a manner that creates a nuisance; and 
(2) AS 46.14.990 defines "emission" as the release of one or more air contaminants to 
the atmosphere. 
(e) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, except AS 09.50.170-09.50.240 and AS 
19.25.080-19.25.180, a person may not bring a civil action to enjoin or abate a private 
nuisance or to recover damages for a private nuisance unless the action is authorized 
by this section. 
CO A person who is shielded under (b) of this section from a nuisance action shall 
indemnify, defend, and hold the state harmless from a claim or court action for inverse 
condemnation, including damages, costs, and attorney fees, for which the state may 
become liable because of the air emission or waste water or solid waste discharge for 
which the person is shielded by (b) of this section. The state shall immediately tender 
the defense of the inverse condemnation claim or court action to the person. The 
provisions of (b) of this section do not apply to shield the person, if the person fails to 
accept or refuses the tender of the defense. A person who prevails in the defense of 
the claim or court action for inverse condemnation described under this subsection 
shall be awarded full reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1994). 
13 [d. It is unclear to what extent the statute leaves private property owners the ability to 
bring creative trespass or inverse condemnation suits to compel the state to pay for the 
impairment of the use of their property. See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 16 (Teacher's 
Manual Update 1994). The law itself alludes to the possibility of inverse condemnation as a 
possible action against the state as a taking without compensation. See ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.45.230(0. However, as one timber industry spokesman noted, "[t]he theory of inverse 
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elimination of common law actions in 1993 in response to heavy lob-
bying by industry.I4 Arguably, the statute wipes out a fundamental 
element of Alaska's common law: actions in private nuisance.I5 This 
Comment examines the role of common law private nuisance actions 
in an environmental context and questions whether the Alaska stat-
ute, by eliminating these common law actions, violates equal protec-
tion. Section II discusses the traditional role of the common law and 
the importance of private nuisance in environmental protection. Sec-
tion II also briefly explores the political dynamic surrounding diverse 
constituents and Alaska politics and examines a controversial private 
nuisance suit pending during the passage of Alaska Statute section 
09.45.230. Finally, Section II discusses the function of federal and 
state environmental permits and the process of obtaining these per-
mits. Section III examines the concept of equal protection and how 
Alaska courts apply this concept under Alaska's Constitution. Section 
IV analyzes Alaska Statute section 09.45.230 in light of equal protec-
tion doctrine under the Alaska Constitution. Section IV also considers 
whether the statute violates state equal protection rights by eliminat-
ing Alaska private property owners' traditional protection under com-
mon law tort. Section V concludes that the traditional right of access 
to the courts should be held "fundamental," triggering the highest 
judicial scrutiny under Alaska's equal protection analysis. Thus, with-
out a compelling state interest, the Alaska statute is unconstitutional. 
Alternatively, if access to courts is not held to be a fundamental right, 
an Alaska court should scrutinize the Alaska statute closely because 
the significance of this right outweighs any governmental interest in 
limiting this right. 
II. THE COMMON LAW, POLITICS, AND PERMITS 
A. Treading on the Common Law 
The precursors of American common law originated in ancient Rome, 
were eventually transformed and adopted in England, and from there 
condemnation [has] not been 'bought' by the courts," and "such a case might be filed once, and 
then likely would not happen again." Testimony on H.B. 282 Before the House Judicial Com-
mittee of Alaska, No. 367 (Apr. 21, 1993) (statement of Jim Clark, Alaska Forest Association) 
(on file with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
14 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 119 (Supp. 1994). 
15 See id. at 301. 
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imported to the United States.16 The common law's purpose was to 
provide a stable and flexible framework to apply justice equitably.17 
The common law was fluid and expanding as its unwritten principles 
originally were derived from local customs and usages that were 
recognized and affirmed by courts.18 
Most statutes do not disturb the common law.19 In some cases, 
however, statutes can broaden or narrow the field of available com-
mon law remedies.20 In these instances, statutes either independently 
change the existing common law remedies or authorize courts to do 
SO.21 Specific legislation aimed at a precise set of circumstances can 
totally eliminate a common law doctrine addressing the same set of 
circumstances.22 
The extent to which common law remedies may be uprooted is, 
however, limited.23 Certain individual constitutional protections-state 
and federal-check a state legislature's ability to enact laws.24 These 
include the protection of substantive constitutional rights and the 
right to rational treatment.25 Sweeping legislative eradication of com-
mon law actions such as the elimination of private nuisance mandated 
by the Alaska statute may violate certain constitutional limitations on 
Alaska lawmaking.26 
16 ARBUCKLE, supra note 6, at 6; see PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 365. 
17 ARBUCKLE, supra note 6, at 6; SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 2.02. 
18 JOHN MAKDISI, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW 31 (1990); see ARBUCKLE, supra 
note 6, at 6. 
19 PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 301. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1186-88 (1992) (discussing constitutional protections of various forms); 
SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, §§ 5.01-.06 (discussing constitutional constraints on legisla-
tures including substantive due process, equal protection, void for vagueness doctrine, proce-
dural due process, nondelegation doctrine, compensation for takings, self-incrimination and 
confidentiality rights, and the right to a jury trial). 
24 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, §§ 5.01-.06. 
25 The right to procedural due process, the right not to be disfavored because of prejudice, 
the right not to be treated differentially with respect to constitutional rights and important 
interests, and the right not to be required to waive a constitutional right to receive a privilege 
or benefit also limit the scope of legislative power. Id. § 5.05. 
26 See id. 
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B. Private Nuisance 
There are several state and federal statutes on which a private 
party might base an action against a polluter.27 A common law nui-
sance action, however, is still an attractive remedy to which a party 
may turn for redress.28 For several centuries, courts have recognized 
a nuisance cause of action.29 "Nuisance" has been defined as, "that 
activity which arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlaw-
ful use by a person of his own property, working an obstruction or 
injury to the right of another or to the public, and producing such 
material annoyance, inconvenience, and discomfort that the law will 
presume resulting damage."3o Nuisance actions may take two forms-
public and private.3! 
A public nuisance is "a condition dangerous to health, offensive to 
community moral standards, or unlawfully obstructing the public in 
the free use of public property."32 More generally, a public nuisance 
may be defined as "any unreasonable interference with rights com-
mon to all members of community in general and encompasses public 
health, safety, peace, morals or convenience."33 A nuisance must affect 
a considerable number of people or an entire community or neighbor-
hood to constitute a "public" nuisance.34 Public nuisances generally are 
abated through actions by public authorities, but private citizens may 
have standing to sue in some instances.35 As Alaska Statute section 
09.45.230 is limited solely to private nuisances and does not eliminate 
public nuisance actions, the scope of this Comment is limited to pri-
vate nuisances.36 
27 See ARBUCKLE, supra note 6, at 3-18. 
28 See Rychlak, supra note 11, at 66l. 
29 See id. 
30 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1065 (6th ed. 1990). The Second Restatement of Torts notes 
three different ways that courts have defined the term "nuisance": (1) as a human activity or a 
physical condition which harms or annoys others; (2) as the actual harm caused by the human 
conduct or physical condition; or (3) as both the conduct or the condition and the harm. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A, cmt.b (1977). 
31 SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 3.0l. 
32 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 1230. 
33 [d. 
34 See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705 (Ariz. 1972). 
35 See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW, CASES, READINGS AND 
TEXT 35-36 (1985). 
36 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230. 
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A "private" nuisance is one that affects rights of a private party as 
opposed to the general public.37 The invasive conduct that occurs in 
nuisance cases usually takes place completely outside the effected 
property.38 Specifically, private nuisance evolved from the common 
law action of assize of novel disseisin.39 An individual's interest in real 
property, the "free tenement," gave certain rights to the holder of 
such an interest, the tenant.40 In a free tenement, the tenant was to 
be protected from improper action under the feudal contract and 
through the action of assize.41 Thus, due process, upon which feudal 
justice was based, was intended to be ensured by the assize.42 
For today's environmental plaintiff, common law "private nuisance 
is the oldest and perhaps the most useful theory" upon which to base 
a claim.43 Private common law nuisance, therefore, plays an important 
role in protecting the environment by providing plaintiffs, often dis-
advantaged relative to their opponents, both substantive and proce-
dural advantages to statutory and regulatory suits.44 Typically, the 
plaintiff in private nuisance actions is an individual or small group and 
37 See Rychlak, supra note 11, at 660. 
38 See id. at 657. 
39 See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 118-19 (1969) (dis-
cussing assize of novel disseisin). Assize courts are, "an ancient species of court, consisting of a 
certain number of men, usually twelve, who were summoned together to try a disputed cause, 
performing the functions of a jury, except that they gave a verdict from their own investigation 
and knowledge and not upon evidence adduced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 
120. Assize of novel disseisin is defined as, "a writ of assize which lay for the recovery of lands 
or tenements, where the claimant had been lately disseised." Id. at 121. Assize of nuisance is, 
"a writ of assize which lay where a nuisance had been committed to the complainant's freehold; 
either for abatement of the nuisance or for damages." Id. 
40 See MILSOM, supra note 39, at 119. 
41 Id. 
42 Here, the term "due process" is not used in the modern sense but rather as a general 
allusion to feudal norms and traditions. See id. 
43 Rychlak, supra note 11, at 661. Nuisance liability can be predicated on intentional or 
substantially certain harm resulting from the plaintiff's conduct, negligence, or strict liability. 
SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 3.04. The issue in a nuisance action is whether the activity 
constitutes a "substantial and unreasonable interference" with the use or enjoyment ofland. Id. 
Balancing lies at the heart of this determination. Id. Several factors bear on the gravity of the 
harm to the plaintiff, including the extent of the harm, the character of the harm, the social 
value which the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded, the suitability of the 
particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality, and the burden on the 
persons harmed or avoiding the harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 827 (1977). Courts 
may consider the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct, the 
suitability of the conduct to the locality, whether it is impractical to prevent or avoid the invasion 
if the activity is maintained, and whether it is impractical to maintain the activity if it is required 
to bear the cost of compensating for the invasion. Id. § 828 (1977). 
44 In addition, the ability to choose a favorable forum, either in state court based on state 
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the defendant is a corporation with a wealth of resources.45 In con-
trast, many of the statutory and regulatory causes of action require 
detailed and expensive scientific experts and tests in order to be 
successful and thus are more difficult for individual or small groups 
of plaintiffs to bring.46 Another drawback to statutory and regulatory 
causes of action is that notice requirements may delay a statutory 
proceeding.47 Also, complex statutory schemes which may be unfamil-
iar to judges, counsel, and jurors may delay further the remedy sought.48 
A private nuisance action can be far more attractive to plaintiffs 
than an action based upon a statute or regulation as private nuisance 
actions tend to be less expensive.49 In addition, a plaintiff need only 
plead that the pollution or activity "looks bad, smells bad, [or] does 
bad things" without delving into a scientific battle that a corporate 
defendant with deep pockets may be far better equipped to win.50 In 
addition, private nuisance claims provide for both injunctive relief and 
damages, while many statutory actions only provide for injunctive 
relief. 51 
C. The Permitting Process 
Defendants in nuisance suits in the past have tried to justify their 
conduct by claiming that they are operating within the parameters of 
a permit or regulation that encompasses the activity alleged to be a 
nuisance.52 State permits, however, often are set as state-wide "mini-
mum standards" and are not meant to grant affirmative rights to 
pollute indefinitely at the prescribed levels.53 Recognizing the prob-
lems of reliance on a standardized permitting process to address 
unreasonable interference with a plaintiff's land, courts consistently 
reject this permit defense.54 
common law action or federal court based on diversity or pendant jurisdiction may provide 
another advantage to the private nuisance plaintiff. [d. 
45 Rychlak, supra note 11, at 66l. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. at 663. 
48 [d. 
49 Cf id. at 66l. 
50 Rychlak, supra note 11, at 661 (citing Langrock, Class Action Litigation, 25 TRIAL, Oct. 
1989, at 47). 
51 Rychlak, supra note 11, at 663. 
52 [d. at 693-94; see also SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 3.06[2]. 
53 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 16 (Teacher's Manual Update 1994); SELMI & MANAS-
TER, supra note 2, § 8.02[3][a]. 
54 PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 28 n.9; see SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 3.06[2]; 
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State permits often are negotiated, and the resulting limits may be 
the product of political compromise rather than determinations of safe 
and reasonable limits on the permitted activity.55 Moreover, even when 
a polluter is not in compliance with the limits of a permit, variances 
often are granted, potentially aggravating the integrity of the permit-
ting process.56 
The impact on specific property holders rarely is included as criteria 
for defining whether an applicant should receive a permit.57 For in-
stance, "none of Alaska's current pollutant-specific emission stand-
ards were developed to protect the public from nuisances, nor was 
nuisance even considered in establishing the standards."58 Alaska, 
"routinely authorizes fifteen tons of particulate matter emissions in a 
permit for ambient air quality protection" and "authorize[s] the dioxin 
emissions that may be present in the same exhaust stream and which 
the department has not reviewed."59 In fact, Alaska never has issued 
a permit with conditions that provide protection to the public from 
nuisance.6o Permits may be written so generally as to be ineffective 
in establishing safe activities and adequately notifying permittees of 
their obligations.61 
Federal permits have latent problems that come to light when the 
arrow of private nuisance is removed from the property owners' 
quiver. Like state emissions or operations permits, federal permits 
sometimes are based on generalized minimum standards that undergo 
minimal scrutiny in speedy administrative permitting processes.62 
Rychlak, supra note 11, at 694 (citing King v. Vicksburg Ry. & Light Co., 42 So. 204, 204 (Miss. 
1906) and Heinl v. Pecher, 198 A. 797, 800 (Penn. 1938)). 
55 See SELMI & MANASTER, supra note 2, § 8.03[2][c] (discussing negotiation between the 
permit applicant and the permitting agency during the permit review stage and the pressure 
on permitting agencies to grant permits in response to threatened lawsuits by an unsatisfied 
applicant). 
56 See id. § 8.04[1] (discussing how variances, usually sought by facilities "facing chronic or 
unexpected difficulties in complying with environmental requirements," may be granted in some 
states when "compliance with requirements is inappropriate because of conditions beyond the 
control of [the party seeking the variance] ... or because of special circumstances which would 
render strict compliance unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or impracticable"). 




6! Cj ARBUCKLE, supra note 6, at 17. 
62 "[T]he public process has never addressed nuisance, or provided an avenue for an individual 
to get the department to establish standards to protect them from nuisance." Stone Memoran-
dum, supra note 1; see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 16 (Teacher's Manual Update 1994). 
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In addition, the activities permitted under federal sanctions are not 
affirmative rights allowing an entity to pollute to such levels.63 Many 
federal environmental statutes expressly preserve state common law 
actions.64 For example, Justice Kennedy, writing for the United States 
Supreme Court in Oulette v. International Paper Co., recognized that 
the savings clause in the Clean Water Act allowing for private state 
law suits manifested a congressional intent to preserve state causes 
of action with respect to water pollution.65 Eliminating state-law reme-
dies in place at the time federal legislation is enacted can destroy 
important protections that shore up a potentially questionable per-
mitting process built into the federal regulatory scheme.66 This type 
of state legislative action, therefore, may frustrate the intent of fed-
eral environmentallegislation.67 
Professor Robert Glicksman has noted that federal environmental 
legislation is based on four values: legitimacy, accommodation, indi-
vidual liberty, and efficiency.68 Glicksman contends that these values 
are the foundation of Congress's intent in federal environmental leg-
islation and they support a narrow category of pre-emption that pre-
serves state common law actions.69 Thus, without the tools of state 
common law individuals might be subjected to injuries never contem-
plated by legislators or agencies writing regulations and issuing per-
mits, potentially denying injured parties access to any judicial forum. 
63 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 16 (Teacher's Manual Update 1994). 
64 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act typifies savings clauses contained in federal 
environmental legislation: "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person 
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
standard or requirement ... or to seek any other relief." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1988). 
65 Oulette v. International Paper Co., 479 U.S. 481, 497-98 (1987). 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 
U. P A. L. REV. 121, 131 (1985). "Legitimacy" is achieved first, by regulating through a politically 
accountable decisionmaker such as an elected official or a bureaucrat subject to various legisla-
tive oversight mechanisms; second, by allowing public participation in the regulating process; 
third, by having at least the perception of a well-informed decisionmaker; fourth, by the 
perception of a fair and even-handed regulatory approach; and fifth, by increasing predictability. 
[d. at 132-33. "Accommodation" is the process of reconciling conflicting interests, including 
conflicts between regulated industrial entities and those adversely affected by pollution. [d. at 
134-35. "Individual liberty" reflects the desire for freedom from arbitrary government interfer-
ence and maximum self-determination. [d. at 133-34. "Efficiency" is defined in economic terms 
as the allocation of resources that "maximizes the total value of production as measured by 
consumers." [d. at 135-37. 
69 See id. at 220-21. 
1996] COMMON LAW PREEMPTION 961 
D. Politics, The Pulp Mill, and Alaska Statute Section 09.45.230 
Concerned citizens might be able to address these potential prob-
lems through political action; however, industry plays a prominent 
role in contemporary Alaska politics.70 Alaska has a political economy 
that is characterized by conflicting pro-development and environ-
mental interests.71 Juneau, Alaska's isolated capital, is home to its tiny 
legislature. The Alaska Senate is comprised of only twenty members, 
with only eleven members' votes needed to block unfavorable legis-
lation.72 Therefore, the Alaska Senate has been the main political 
target of industry lobbyists. Today, one might assume that industry 
always has played an important role in Alaska politics; however, this 
was not always the case, especially in the years prior to Alaska's 
statehood.73 Alaska's dependence on industrial tax revenue and cam-
paign contributions, however, has allowed industry to become the 
prominent voice in Alaska politics.74 
This dynamic may have played some role in the final outcome of a 
private nuisance suit filed in 1992 against the Alaska Pulp Corporation 
(APC), which owned a pulp mill in Sitka, Alaska.75 The plaintiffs 
70 See GERALD A. McBETH & THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, ALASKA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 
51-74 (1994). In an effort to accommodate several different interests, from 1977 until 1990, 
Alaska politicians have spent $26.7 billion on varying programs and projects. JOHN 
STROHMEYER, EXTREME CONDITIONS: BIG OIL AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ALASKA 205-
16 (1993). However, McBeth notes that spending in Alaska flows to a wide range of projects and 
has not consistently been given to "the kinds of projects that might be characterized as essential 
to industrial development." McBETH, supra, at 67. 
71 McBETH, supra note 70, at 51. 
72 STROHMEYER, supra note 70, at 205. 
73 Even after the first commercially productive oil well was struck in Alaska, industry reaped 
substantial profits from the collection and processing of Alaska's resources without paying taxes. 
STROHMEYER, supra note 70, at 207. After statehood in 1959, and after enabling legislation that 
ended taxing inequities in 1962, industry eventually was compelled to enter the political arena. 
See id. 
The oil industry has considerable political power. McBETH, supra note 70, at 69. For example, 
the Alaska legislature passed an incentive for continued oil production, the Economic Limit 
Factor (ELF), which was applied to two very profitable and productive oil fields with the 
expectation that the ELF would be modified as to those two fields. Id. at 69-70. The oil industry 
was able to block attempted changes in the ELF for two years after its application to the two 
already productive fields. Id. 
74 The oil industry fueled Alaska state revenues by more than 80% during the 1980s. McBETH, 
supra note 70, at 68. The oil industry contributed $422,000 to make it the largest single source 
of campaign funds for state legislative candidates in 1992. Id. at 70. Additionally, industry brings 
workers to the state, increasing its proportion of the populace and encouraging workers to 
become politically active. See id. at 212-13. It even has been said that some legislators look into 
the gallery for signals from lobbyists on how to vote. Id. at 206. 
75 Sitka residents, however, were not the only parties disturbed by APC's pollution. In 1993, 
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alleged APC recklessly released industrial waste into Sitka's Silver 
Bay and fumes containing sulfur dioxide and particulates into the air 
resulting in damage to the quality oflife of waterfront property owners.76 
The named plaintiff, Larry Edwards, and a class of potentially 150 
other owners of waterfront property,77 sought damages as well as 
injunctive relief.78 The injunction would require the mill to install an 
expensive water recycling system to curb its daily discharge of forty-
million gallons of industrial waste into Sitka's Silver Bay.79 
Almost simultaneously, the Alaska legislature introduced Senate 
Bill 178, entitled An Act Relating to Civil Nuisance Actions-the 
precursor to Alaska Statute section 09.45.230.80 The stated purpose of 
Alaska Statute section 09.45.230 is to prohibit parties, frustrated by 
their inability to block the issuance or renewal of permits, from abus-
ing nuisance law to achieve their otherwise futile ends.81 However, in 
the House committee hearings on Senate Bill 178 which later became 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) threatened a lawsuit against APC because the 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), the EPA's Alaska counterpart, failed to 
impose stiffer penalties on APC. Eben Punderson, EPA: State Too Easy On APC Mill in 
SITKA, SITKA DAILY SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 1993. DEC had filed APC's operating permit without 
incorporating a myriad of changes requested by the EPA during the public comment period 
associated with the consent decree. Id. The EPA warned DEC that failure: (1) to include higher 
fines based on the economic benefit received by APC's failure to install pollution control equip-
ment; (2) to shorten the time within which APC would be required to install such equipment; 
and (3) to mandate improved methods for collecting air quality data in the consent decree would 
result in a lawsuit brought by the EPA against APC. Id. 
76 Class Action Suit Filed Against APC, SITKA DAILY SENTINEL, Mar. 2,1992; Punderson, 
supra note 75. 
77 The other owners of potentially affected waterfront property along Silver Bay, including 
the City of Sitka, did not join the suit immediately. Class Action Suit Filed Against APC, SITKA 
DAILY SENTINEL, Mar. 2, 1992. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80 Sponsor Statement of Senate Bill 178 by Alaska Senator Robin L. Taylor, Senate Majority 
Leader (Mar. 31, 1993) (on file with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
81 The sponsor statement of Robin L. Taylor, Alaska Senate Majority Leader, states that the 
purpose of Senate Bill 178 is: 
to clarify existing law and to protect permit holders from being sued for doing con-
ducting [sic] those activities which are authorized by their permit .... Alaska needs to 
maintain its orderly society. Both state and local governments must be able to permit 
activities or hold permits for their own activities without the prospect of being sued 
by every person who simply opposes the permitted activity .... Senate Bill No. 178 
amends Alaska's general nuisance statute to clarify the standard to be used by courts 
in determining whether or not an act or structure is in fact a nuisance. The goal is to 
prevent lawsuits against permit holders when they are acting within the limits of 
their permits. Senate Bill 178 would NOT protect any permit holder from a nuisance 
action if the permit holder exceeds or violates the limits of the permit. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Alaska Statute section 09.45.230, the Attorney General Designee em-
phasized that, "there are appropriate remedies and sanctions that the 
court may impose on those that abuse the process."82 In addition, he 
acknowledged that, "the underlying motive for [Alaska Statute sec-
tion 09.45.230] is to make Alaska more 'user friendly' to the resource 
extraction industries."83 Several individuals who testified before state 
legislators, however, questioned the bill's actual purpose as well as the 
Senate President's connection with APC.84 Thus, Alaska Statute sec-
tion 09.45.230 may be open to constitutional attack. 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION 
In all state constitutional cases, Alaska courts begin with the pre-
sumption that the challenged legislation is proper.85 This presumption 
stems from the reasoning that it is not the judiciary's role to decide 
upon the wisdom of a statute and that the legislature is better equipped 
to balance competing social viewpoints.86 Thus, plaintiffs claiming vio-
lations of Alaska's equal protection clause have a heavy burden.87 
The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution guarantees 
that, "all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, and the enjoyment ofthe rewards of their own industry; 
that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, 
and protection under the law."88 In Alaska, this "equal protection" 
clause of the state constitution has been interpreted as affording 
broader protections than its federal counterpart.89 In addition, Alaska's 
courts have rejected the static federal two-tiered equal protection 
analysis and instead apply a single, sliding standard in all state equal 
protection cases.90 In equal protection cases involving fundamental 
rights or suspect classifications, Alaska courts are bound to a "com-
82 Testimony on S.B. 178 Before the House Finance Committee of Alaska 1 (Mar. 9, 1994) 
(statement of Bruce Bothelho, Attorney General Designee, Alaska Department of Law) (on file 
with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
83 [d. at 2. 
84 Testimony on H.E. 282 Before the House Judiciary Committee of Alaska 1 (Apr. 21, 1993) 
(statement of Jeffery D. Trout) (on file with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.); PLATER ET AL., supra 
note 3, at 16 (Teacher's Manual Update 1994). 
85 See Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Alaska 1992). 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (1994). 
89 See, e.g., Burnor v. State, 829 P.2d 837, 839 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). 
90 See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978) (discussing dissatisfaction with the federal 
two-tiered rational basis and compelling state interest tests). 
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pelling state interest standard" that mirrors the strict scrutiny test 
of the federal system.91 
A. Alaska s Sliding Equal Protection Scale and 
Fundamental Rights 
1. The Derivation of Fundamental Rights 
"Rights" in American jurisprudence have been divided into broad 
categories-those that are or are not fundamental and those that are 
explicit or implicit. Alaska's equal protection clause protects individu-
als from several types of governmental action that frustrate the fun-
damental bases of the Alaska Constitution.92 These primary constitu-
tional foundations are deemed "fundamental rights."93 Cases concerning 
Alaska's equal protection doctrine sometimes involve the judicial ar-
ticulation of these fundamental rights because the level of scrutiny 
changes in relation to the importance of the right affected.94 
In State v. Rice, the Alaska Supreme Court stated, 
if we find such fundamental rights to be within the intention and 
spirit of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for 
the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core 
of our constitutional heritage ... we need not stand by ... waiting 
for constitutional direction from the highest court in the land.95 
For example, in McCracken v. State, plaintiff McCracken petitioned 
to represent himself in post-conviction relief proceedings.96 In deter-
mining whether the unenumerated right to post-conviction relief was 
retained by Alaska citizens, the court examined the rights enjoyed by 
Alaska inhabitants prior to statehood and concluded, "we are of the 
opinion that a right so long established and of such fundamental 
importance must be held to have been so retained."97 Traditional individ-
ual rights that are vital to society and paramount within the consti-
91 See Erickson, 574 P.2d at 11; see also State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1975) (stating 
that when a fundamental right is abridged by a statute or regulation, the statute or regulation 
will be upheld only after a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a 
compelling and substantial state interest). 
92 See, e.g., Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Alaska 1973). 
93 See id. 
94 See Alaska v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 112 (Alaska 1981). 
95 [d. (quoting Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970». 
96 McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 87 (Alaska 1974). 
97 [d. at 91. 
1996] COMMON LAW PREEMPTION 965 
tutional structure of government are fundamental and protected un-
der Alaska's Constitution.98 
The Alaska Constitution affirmatively grants to all persons the 
natural right to liberty.99 Exactly what activities are protected by this 
liberty right, however, is unclear because the concept of liberty is 
broad, "illusive" and "incapable of definitive, comprehensive explana-
tion."loo The Alaska Constitution, however, provides that the rights 
retained by the people are not limited to those explicitly stated in the 
Alaska Constitution.101 Some fundamental rights derive from this lib-
erty guarantee.102 
The Alaska Supreme Court in Breese v. Smith discussed an implicit 
fundamental right derived from this liberty guaranty.I03 In Breese, the 
Alaska Supreme Court held that under Alaska's constitutional liberty 
guarantee, although it is not expressly protected by the Alaska Con-
stitution, individuals attending public schools possess an implicit fun-
damental right to wear their hair as they see fit.Io4 The Alaska Su-
preme Court reasoned that the choice to wear one's hair long was 
protected by citizens' liberty right to control one's self free from 
governmental interference and traditionally has been protected by 
the common law and was intended by the framers of both the Alaska 
and United States Constitutions.105 
In both McCracken v. State and Breese, the court derived implicit 
fundamental rights from the Alaska Constitution using an interpre-
tive method based upon tradition.106 Fundamental rights rooted in 
tradition or implicit in the Alaska Constitution's liberty right, al-
though not explicitly stated, can be derived using these approaches.107 
98 See Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 756 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988); Freitag v. Gohr, 651 
P.2d 356, 357 (Alaska 1982) (Matthews J., dissenting). 
99 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (1980). Section 1 states: "Inherent Rights. This constitution is 
dedicated to the principles that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry .... " ld. 
100 See id. 
101 Section 21 of Article I of the Alaska Constitution states, "[tJhe enumeration of rights in 
this constitution shall not impair or deny others retained by the people." ALASKA CONST. art. 
I, § 21 (1980). 
102 See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972). 
103 ld. 
104 ld. The court noted, however, that fundamental rights may be subject to certain govern-
ment-imposed limitations to accommodate a competing state interest. See id. at 170. 
105 See id. at 169. 
106 See McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 87 (Alaska 1974); Breese, 501 P.2d at 168. 
107 See McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91; Breese, 501 P.2d at 168. 
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Thus, one might include access to the courts in the category of tradi-
tional pillars of American society and elevate it to fundamental status.108 
2. Triggering Heightened Scrutiny: The Compelling State Interest 
Standard 
Upon the determination that a fundamental interest is encroached, 
Alaska courts must apply a compelling state interest standard.109 This 
standard imposes a heavy burden on the state to prove that the 
statute or regulation in question is necessary to promote a substantial 
state interestYo For example, in Breese, the Alaska Supreme Court 
held that the government had the burden of showing a compelling 
governmental interest because the state action encroached upon a 
fundamental right.111 The court articulated this standard as a "sub-
stantial burden of justification" requiring the governmental body to 
show the furtherance of a substantial governmental interest.112 The 
school board, the governmental body in Breese, failed to meet this 
burden by not proving "'hard facts' pertaining to the causal relation-
ship between appearance and behavior."113 Thus, the compelling state 
interest standard shifts a substantial burden to the government under 
Alaska's sliding equal protection scaleY4 
3. Equal Protection Absent a Fundamental Right: The Uniform 
Balancing Test 
Absent a fundamental right in equal protection cases, the legisla-
tive infringement on rights or the classifications created by a statute 
are balanced against the nature of the rights affected under the 
Alaska Constitution.115 Alaska courts in these cases apply a "uniform 
balancing" or "sliding" scrutiny test.116 The test is flexible depending 
on the importance of the right involved.ll7 In "sliding" scrutiny cases, 
108 See Freitag v. Gohr, 651 P.2d 356, 356 (Alaska 1982) (Matthews J., dissenting). 
109 See Breese, 501 P.2d at 171-72. 
110 See id. at 172-74. 
III [d. at 170. 
112 [d. at 171. 
113 [d. at 172. Although this school regulation was promulgated by one school official, the court 
stated that had the regulation been passed through some democratic process, the individual 
liberty interest would not be diminished. See id. at 174. 
114 See Breese, 501 P.2d at 174. 
115 Burnor v. State, 829 P.2d 837, 839 (Alaska 1992); State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 110 (Alaska 
1981). 
116 See Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Alaska 1988). 
117 See id. 
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Alaska courts: (1) assign constitutional weight to the right affected; 
(2) examine the purposes served by the challenged statute; and (3) 
evaluate the state interest in the particular means employed by the 
state to achieve its objectives.l1s The "sliding" scrutiny test imposes 
a higher burden on the state to show that the limitation of those rights 
or classifications bears a fair and substantial connection to a legitimate 
governmental interest in relation to the importance of the right af-
fected.ll9 
B. Access to Courts in Alaska 
The interest in redressing wrongs via the judicial process is sig-
nificant and a bar of that right strikes at the heart of several consti-
tutional protections.12o Justice Matthews joined by Chief Justice Rabi-
nowitz of the Alaska Supreme Court, dissenting in Freitag v. Gohr, 
expounded the importance of access to the judicial system.121 They 
stated, "that effective access to the courts is an important right is 
beyond peradventure. In fact, 'it is clear that ready access to the 
courts is one of, perhaps the, fundamental constitutional right."'122 The 
Justices elaborated, explaining that the judicial system is the primary 
institution for the assertion, protection, and enforcement of most 
other rights granted in our society.123 Thus, in Justices Matthews's and 
Rabinowitz's view, because the right of access to the courts is "pre-
servative of all rights" it should be deemed fundamental. 124 
For example, denying a parolee access to civil court has been held 
to violate the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution.125 In 
Bush v. Reid, the plaintiff, a felon on parole, filed suit to recover 
damages sustained in an automobile accident.126 The trial court granted 
the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Alaska Statute section 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 See Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (Alaska 1983). 
121 Freitag v. Gohr, 651 P.2d 356, 356 (Alaska 1982)(Matthews, J., dissenting). In this case, Gohr 
filed suit to obtain payment under a contract and the Freitags appealed after a judgment for 
Gohr. When the Freitags' appeal was dismissed as untimely they petitioned to the Alaska 
Supreme Court to review whether the superior court had abused its discretion in dismissing 
the appeal. [d. 
122 [d. at 357 (quoting Cruz v. Hauk, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973». 
12:1 [d. 
124 [d. But see Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988) (stating that 
under Alaska's sliding equal protection scale, although an important right, access to the courts 
is not a fundamental interest). 
125 Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Alaska 1973). 
126 [d. at 1215. 
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11.05.070127 which, when read in conjunction with Alaska Statute sec-
tion 33.15.190/28 suspends a felon's civil rights, including the ability to 
maintain an action for civil damages arising from an automobile acci-
dent while in the parole board's custody.129 
In Bush, the Alaska Supreme Court relied on the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in Boddie v. Connecticut to reverse the trial 
court.130 In Boddie, the petitioner was barred from a divorce proceed-
ing.131 The Boddie Court recognized "the centrality of the concept of 
due process in maintaining both order and justice in the resolution 
of disputes which inevitably arise from human interaction."132 The 
Alaska Supreme Court in Bush, explained the Boddie holding, stating: 
"[ w ]here the state commands a monopoly over the only available 
legitimate means of dispute settlement and the relationship underly-
ing the dispute is warp and woof of the fabric of society, the state may 
not deny access to the forum of settlement on the account of pov-
erty."133 
The Bush court noted, however, the "superficial distinctions" be-
tween Boddie and the case at bar, and concluded that, "the denial of 
access to civil courts rends the fabric of justice as surely here as in 
Boddie."134 The court reasoned that the state has a monopoly over the 
127 Alaska Statute § 11.05.070 (repealed 1986) provided: "[al judgment of imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for a term less than for life suspends the civil rights of the person sentenced, and 
forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority, or power during the term or duration 
of imprisonment." ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.070 (repealed 1986). 
128 Alaska Statute § 33.15.190 (repealed 1986) provided: 
[tlhe board may permit a parolee to return to his home if it is in the state, or to go 
elsewhere in the state, upon such terms and conditions, including personal reports from 
the paroled person as the board prescribes. The board may permit the parolee to go 
into another state upon terms and conditions as the board prescribes, and subject to 
the provisions of any compact executed under the authority of ch. 10 of this title and 
amendments to it. A prisoner released on parole remains in the legal custody of the 
board until the expiration of the maximum term or terms to which he was sentenced, 
less good time allowances provided by law. While in the custody of the board, a person 
is subject to the disabilities imposed by AS 11.05.070. 
ALASKA STAT. § 33.15.190 (repealed 1986). 
129 Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1215-16 (Alaska 1973). 
130 Id. at 1219. In Boddie v. Connecticut, the petitioner argued that imposition of a filing fee 
on an indigent party in a divorce proceeding violated due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372 (1971). 
131 See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380--83. 
132 Bush, 516 P.2d at 1218. 
133 Id. Additionally, the court, in a takings-like analysis, noted that a civil action such as Bush's 
action for personal injuries is a form of property and the statutory scheme in Alaska totally 
diminished the value of the claim. Id. at 1218-19. 
134 Id. at 1218 (emphasis added). 
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"paramount process" of dispute resolution where private attempts to 
repair the breach of individual relationships has failed. 135 
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has held that access to the 
courts is not a fundamental right.136 In Keyes v. Humana Hospital, 
Inc., the petitioner challenged Alaska Statute section 09.55.536137 which 
mandated pre-trial review of medical malpractice claims by an expert 
advisory panel whose written report is admissible at trial.138 Among 
other complaints, Keyes argued that this process violated her rights 
under Alaska's equal protection clause.139 
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that access to the courts, al-
though important, was not a fundamental right, therefore, the statute 
did not violate the petitioner's equal protection rights.140 The court 
reasoned that the review panel provision did not impinge significantly 
on Keyes's access to the courts.141 The court's rationale also was based 
upon a number of decisions recognizing the legitimacy of solving "the 
malpractice insurance crisis" by increasing the availability and lower-
ing the cost of medical malpractice insurance.142 The court upheld the 
statute because Keyes was not completely barred from bringing suit 
and because Keyes failed to make any showing that the medical 
review panels were unlikely to achieve their legitimate purpose of 
encouraging settlement without judicial proceedings.143 
D. Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc. 
Although there are no Alaska cases directly on point, Patrick v. 
Lynden Transport, Inc. provides some useful insight into the applica-
135Id. 
136 Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988). 
137 Alaska Statute § 09.55.536 provides in relevant part: 
(a) In an action for damages due to personal injury or death based upon the provision 
of professional services by a health care provider when the parties have not agreed to 
arbitration ofthe claim under AS 09.55.535, the court shall appoint within 20 days after 
filing of answer to a summons and complaint a three-person expert advisory panel .... 
(e) The report of the panel with any dissenting or concurring opinion is admissible in 
evidence to the same extent as though its contents were orally testified to by the 
person or persons preparing it .... 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (1994). 
138 See Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 345 (Alaska 1988). 
139 See id at 357. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 358 (stating that the medical review panel requirement would delay a medical 
malpractice suit at most 80 days). 
142 See id. at 357. 
143 See Keyes, 750 P.2d at 357. 
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tion of Alaska's equal protection doctrine.144 Patrick, a resident of 
Idaho suing Lynden for allegedly breaching a lease, was required by 
Alaska statute 09.60.060.145 to post a bond to cover Lynden's expected 
attorney's fees and litigation costS.146 Patrick had lived in Alaska from 
1981 to 1986 during which time he leased a truck to Lynden Transport, 
144 See Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988). Texas Workers' 
Compensation Commission v. Garcia is another case combining these principles which involves 
a statute restricting state common law action. See Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. 
Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. App. 1993), rev'd 893 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Texas 1995). This suit was 
brought by Hector Garcia who challenged the new Workers' Compensation Act (Act) on several 
state constitutional grounds, including equal protection. Id. at 73. The plaintiff based his argu-
ment on the fact that as an employee of a company that continued to purchase workers' 
compensation coverage after the effective date of the new Act, Garcia would not be able to elect 
his common law rights and remedies. See id. at 68. The relevant portion of the Act deals with 
determination of benefits based on the American Medical Association Impairment Guides 
(Guides). See id. at 80-81. The Guides' impairment rating is used by the Act as "a percentage 
factor in computing the amount to be paid [under a workers' compensation claim], a method 
specifically disapproved of by the Guides." See id. at 81. 
The Act does, however, provide for several opportunities to be heard. See Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 
at 514-15. Within the Act there is a three-stage hearing process. Id. An injured party first is 
granted a benefit review conference, second, a contested case hearing, and third, an adminis-
trative appeal. [d. A party that remains unsatisfied with the ultimate determination made 
through this administrative process, is allowed to appeal to the courts under a modified de novo 
review. Id. at 515. 
Under Texas law, absent a finding of legislative impairment of a fundamental right, a statute 
violates the Texas equal protection clause only if it is not rationally related to legitimate state 
purposes. See id. at 524. Utilizing this low standard, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the Act. 
[d. at 510. The Texas Supreme Court compared the available remedies under the common law 
to those granted in the new Act and held that the new Act was an adequate and reasonable 
substitute. Id. at 523. 
There are, however, key analytical differences between Alaska's and Texas's equal protection 
analyses. In Alaska, the amount of judicial scrutiny va~es with the importance of the right 
affected. Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1377-78. This contrasts with the static two-tiered analysis used 
by Texas courts. Compare id. at 1378--79 'With Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 525. The Alaska test allows 
for varied judicial scrutiny depending on the primacy of the right involved whereas the Texas 
approach utilizes only the compelling state interest or rational basis standard. See Patrick, 765 
P.2d at 1378--79. 
145 Alaska Statute § 09.60.060 provides: 
Security for costs where plaintiff a nonresident or foreign corporation. When the 
plaintiff in an action resides out of the state or is a foreign corporation, security for the 
costs and attorney's fees, which may be awarded against the plaintiff, may be required 
by the defendant, if timely demand is made within 30 days after the defendant discov-
ers that the plaintiff is a non resident. When required, all proceedings in the action 
shall be stayed until an undertaking executed by one or more sufficient sureties is filed 
with the court to the effect that they will pay the costs and attorney's fees which are 
awarded against the plaintiff, for not less than $200. A new or an additional undertak-
ing may be ordered by the court upon proof that the original undertaking is insufficient 
in amount or security. 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.060 (1994). 
146 Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1375, 1376. 
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Inc.147 Subsequently, Patrick moved to Idaho where he resided when 
he brought an action for breach of the lease. Patrick, as a nonresident, 
was required by statute to post a security bond for the litigation costs 
and attorney's fees that might be levied against him.148 The proceed-
ings were stayed until Patrick posted a five thousand dollar bond.149 
Patrick filed a petition for review to challenge the court order.150 
Patrick argued that the statute violated several state and federal 
constitutional provisions, including Alaska's equal protection clause.151 
The Alaska Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the 
statute does not completely bar nonresidents from litigating in an 
Alaska court.152 The effect of the statute, according to the court, was 
to discriminate between nonresidents who can afford to post a bond 
and those who cannot, as well as to discriminate between residents 
and nonresidents generally.153 In determining the weight that should 
be awarded to Patrick's interest in access to the courts, the court first 
concluded that access to the courts was not a fundamental right under 
Alaska's Constitution.l54 Nonetheless, the Alaska Supreme Court stated 
that access to the courts is "important" and that "statutory infringe-
ment of that right is deserving of close scrutiny."155 
The Patrick court next examined the legislature's purpose in en-
acting the statute; "to provide security for costs and attorney's fees 
that may be awarded against a plaintiff, from whom it may be difficult 
to collect because of the plaintiff's nonresidence." The court accepted 
this legislative purpose as legitimate, but held that the means by which 
the legislature sought to promote that purpose were not sufficiently 
narrow given the importance of the right of access to the courtS.156 
147 [d. 
148 [d. 
149 [d. at 1377. 
150 [d. 
151 Patrick alleged violations of Article IV, § 15 of the Alaska Constitution which grants the 
Alaska Supreme Court rulemaking authority, violations of state and federal due process, viola-
tions of state and federal equal protection, and violation of the federal Privileges and Immunities 




155 [d. at 1379. 
156 Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1379 (stating "we do not believe the legislature's chosen means to 
effectuate this purpose are sufficiently well-tailored to its ends where the important constitu-
tional right of access to the courts is infringed"J. Due to their disposition on the equal protection 
claim, the court chose not to decide the merits of Patrick's other constitutional claims. [d. at 
1380 n.6. 
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The Patrick court reasoned that the statute was both overinclusive 
and underinclusive.157 The statute was overinclusive because it re-
quired all nonresidents to post a security bond when it could not be 
assumed that all nonresidents would be uncooperative in paying awards 
of attorney's fees and litigation costs or would lack sufficient attach-
able assets. l58 On the other hand, the statute was underinclusive be-
cause it was based on the invalid presumption that only nonresident 
plaintiffs would be uncooperative in paying debts.159 Alaska Statute 
section 09.60.060 also ignored the fact that "illiquid" resident plaintiffs 
might be more difficult to collect from than "liquid" nonresidents.16o 
Moreover, Alaska's Civil Rules provided for, "partial compensation for 
attorney [sic] fees as a matter of course."161 The Alaska Supreme 
Court held that the statute was not sufficiently related to the purpose 
of providing security for attorney's fees and litigation costs to defen-
dants, and therefore violated Patrick's equal protection rights.162 
IV. ANALYSIS OF ALASKA STATUTE SECTION 09.45.230 
A. Judicial Access as a Fundamental Interest and 
a Compelling State Interest 
Alaska Statute section 09.45.230 should be held to implicate an 
implicit fundamental right under the equal protection clause of the 
Alaska Constitution of a landowner burdened by a nuisance sanc-
tioned by the statute.l63 Although access to a civil judicial proceeding 
is not an explicitly enumerated right, it may still be implicit in Alaska's 
traditions. l64 The right of a landowner burdened by a private nuisance 
to access the judicial system has great significance.165 Although Alaska 
courts have found, in cases where there was not a complete bar to an 




161 Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1380. The court stated that Civil Rule 82 could result in substantial 
awards that were affirmed by the Alaska Supreme Court up to $348,000. [d. 
162 [d. 
163 See Freitag v. Gohr, 651 P.2d 356, 357 (Alaska 1982); Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 
(Alaska 1973). 
164 See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. 
165 If a parolee who has lost some measure of his civil rights has a fundamental right to bring 
a suit for damages resulting from an automobile accident, then arguably a property owner has 
a fundamental right to be heard in court and seek relief after her land is damaged. See Bush, 
516 P.2d at 1218. 
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entire cause of action, that the right to access to courts was not 
fundamental, the right was still held to be significant.166 Alaska courts 
should expand this ruling to protect the right of access to the courts 
as a fundamental constitutional right as Alaska courts have in several 
instances touted the importance of this right.167 '!\vo justices of the 
Alaska Supreme Court have stated that the right of access to the 
courts is perhaps the fundamental right because of its unique ability 
to enforce and preserve other rights.168 Moreover, without access to a 
judicial forum, statutes infringing on other fundamental rights, like 
the right to wear ones hair how one chooses, never could have been 
challenged.169 
In House Finance Committee Testimony, Alaska's Attorney Gen-
eral Designee noted that, "it is a fundamental principle of law that a 
person has a right to reasonable use and enjoyment of his property 
and to the extent there is substantial interference with that right, the 
person is entitled to a remedy or some form of compensation."17o The 
Attorney General Designee recognized that the Alaska statute, then 
a bill, "disallows a remedy to private property owners," and that, "this 
may raise a question of constitutionality."171 
In addition, here, as in Boddie v. Connecticut, the state has a monopoly 
over the primary process by which nuisance disputes are resolved 
when private attempts at settlement have failed,172 and unlike Keyes 
v. Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc., the bar on private nuisance actions 
is absolute.173 Thus, deprivation of this liberty interest traditionally 
afforded citizens should constitute a denial of a fundamental right 
under Alaska's Constitution.174 
Therefore, in reviewing the statute under Alaska's equal protection 
standard, an Alaska court should require the state to prove a compel-
ling state interest because a fundamental right has been implicated.175 
166 See, e.g., Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1379; Bush, 516 P.2d at 1218. 
167 See supra notes 120--24 and accompanying text. 
168 See id. 
169 See supra notes 103--05 and accompanying text. 
170 Testimony on S.B. 178 Before the House Finance Committee of Alaska 1 (Mar. 9, 1994) 
(statement of Bruce Bothelho, Attorney General Designee, Alaska Department of Law) (on file 
with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
171 [d. 
172 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 141 and accompanying text; Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Alaska 1973). 
174 See supra notes 120--24 and accompanying text. 
175 See State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 112 (Alaska 1981); Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537, 538 (Alaska 
1974) (discussing the careful scrutiny taken to "ensure adequate protection of the interest 
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Under this standard the state would have a difficult, if not impossible, 
barrier to surmount.176 Alaska's interest in weeding out meritless 
private nuisance suits is questionable at best.177 There are only two 
reported private nuisance cases since statehood was granted to Alaska 
and passage of the statute apparently was aimed specifically at the 
suit against APC.178 
Even assuming a legitimate interest, the state cannot show that the 
statute is necessary to accomplish its objectives.179 First, there are 
already procedural rules against bringing meritless suits of any kind 
which the state would have to prove were uniquely ineffective in 
weeding out frivolous private nuisance suits in relation to all tort 
claims.180 Second, Alaska probably would be unable to show that the 
statute was the least intrusive measure that could be utilized to halt 
the filing of meritless claims.181 For example, the state could have 
provided for stiffer sanctions for meritless private nuisance claims.182 
In addition, if upheld, the Alaska statute would uphold the forsaken 
permit defense.183 The statute assumes that permitted activities have 
been considered thoroughly and determined to be safe and generally 
reasonable to the surrounding community.l84 However, this is rarely 
the case. Under the compelling interest standard it would be unlikely 
that Alaska could prove a sufficient justification for the statute's 
encroachment of a fundamental right.185 
involved"); Bush, 516 P.2d at 1219; BREST, supra note 23, at 958-62; SELMI & MANASTER, supra 
note 2, § 5.05[1]. 
176 See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 170-75 (Alaska 1972) (characterizing the evidence 
presented by the appellees as insufficient to sustain their burden). 
177 See supra notes 75-84, 156--B2 and accompanying text. 
178 See generally Gates v. City of Tenaki Springs, 822 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1991); Wood v. Alm, 
516 P.2d 137 (Alaska 1973). See also Naftali Bendavid, Edwards, et al. v. Alaska Pulp Corp., et 
al., LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 16. 
179 See Breese, 501 P.2d at 172-75 (exemplifying the difficulty in proving a sufficient connection 
between the specific limitation on a fundamental right and the objectives sought by the statute 
or regulation). 
180 See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 11; see also Breese, 501 P.2d at 170 n.44. 
181 See Breese, 501 P.2d at 171 n.52 (stating that the limitations on a fundamental right imposed 
by government regulation can be "no greater than is essential" to further the governmental 
interest justifying the limitation). 
182 See Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379-80 (Alaska 1988). 
183 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.230; see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
184 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 119. 
185 See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text. 
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C. Alaska Statute Section 09 . .45.230 and Uniform Balancing 
Even if access to the courts is not a fundamental right, Alaska 
Statute section 09.45.230 should still be declared unconstitutional.l86 
An Alaska court, under a uniform balancing test, should begin with 
the presumption that the statute is constitutional.187 A court may, 
however, find that although it may not be a fundamental right, the 
right of access to the courts is important enough to warrant close 
scrutiny under Keyes v. Humana Hospital Alaska, Inc. and Patrick 
v. Lynden Transport, Inc. l88 Such a dramatic restriction on a land-
owner's ability to oppose regulatory action, which perhaps unexpect-
edly harms the landowner's property, broadly denies private property 
owners their important and traditional tort protections.189 
Even under this lower standard, the Alaska Legislature's means 
are not sufficiently narrow given: (1) the traditional importance of the 
right of access to the courts; (2) that there may be instances where 
access to the courts is barred completely; (3) the measures already in 
place to protect defendants against meritless suits; and (4) the less 
intrusive measures available.1OO The Alaska statute is similar to the 
one at issue in Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc. in that it is both 
overinclusive and underinclusive.191 The Alaska statute is overinclu-
sive because it bars meritorious private nuisance actions as well as 
those without merit. l92 The Alaska statute is underinclusive because 
it assumes that private nuisance plaintiffs are more likely to bring 
meritless claims than are other tort plaintiffs.193 Thus, after examining 
the legislature's purposes in enacting the statute and the means by 
which the legislature sought to promote those purposes, an Alaska 
court should strike down Alaska Statute section 09.45.230.194 
186 See supra section III.D. 
187 See Municipality of Anchorage v. Leigh, 823 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Alaska 1992). 
188 See Patrick v. Lynden Transp., Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 1988). 
189 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. 
190 Due to their disposition on the equal protection claim, the court chose not to decide the 
merits of Patrick's other constitutional claims. Patrick, 765 P.2d at 1380 n.6. 
191 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
194 See id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The potential harm that might go unaddressed as a consequence of 
Alaska Statute section 09.45.230 seems to indicate that perhaps the 
electorate itself is the underrepresented group, as the powerful in-
dustrial lobby shapes environmental policy through a sweeping re-
striction of an historically powerful weapon against individualized 
harms. This runs contrary to our most basic ideas of republican gov-
ernment. It is this type of inequity, created by avaricious conglomer-
ates that equal protection can in some instances ameliorate. By allow-
ing one group to deny another a fundamental right, the court performs 
no checking function and indeed eviscerates the constitutional protec-
tions that exist to protect individuals who lack the political and finan-
cial clout to demand effective representation. 
Courts that uphold legislation such as Alaska Statute section 
09.45.230-the product of a defective political process-are no longer 
neutral forums for addressing citizens' grievances, but are, in reality, 
agents of the entrenched Alaska industrial lobby. Alaska courts should 
step forward when legislation affects such a significant right and 
apply heightened scrutiny, rather than support the products of a 
defective political process under the guise of objectively deferring to 
the legislature. 
